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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION - TAX ACCOUNTING - PREPAID
INCOME FALLING DUE BUT REMAINING UNPAID DURING THE YEAR
INCLUDED IN GROSS INCOME FOR THAT YEAR.
Schlude v. Commissioner (U.S. 1963)
The taxpayers, operators of dance studios,' offered lessons under con-
tracts by which advances in cash payments, notes receivable, and contract
installments were received.2 Under the taxpayers' accrual system of ac-
counting, the total contract price was entered into a "deferred income"
account. When each fiscal period ended, income was recognized for the
lessons given by deducting that amount from the deferred income account.3
The Commissioner, however, included in gross income for tax purposes
the advance payments, and the amounts of the notes and the contracts.
The Tax Court4 and the Court of Appeals5 upheld this. The Supreme
Court retreated somewhat,6 but otherwise, by a five to four decision,
affirmed, holding that the Commissioner properly exercised his discretion
under the Internal Revenue Code 7 in rejecting the studio's accounting
system as not clearly reflecting income, and in including as income in a
particular year advance payments by way of cash, negotiable notes and
contract installments falling due but remaining unpaid during the year.
Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128, 83 S.Ct. 601 (1963).
1. Pursuant to franchise agreements with Arthur Murray, Inc., the studio was
obligated to pay to Arthur Murray, Inc., weekly, 10% of cash receipts from cash
payments and discounted negotiable notes, and to hold 5% of receipts in escrow until
a $20,000 indemnity fund was accumulated.
2. Under the cash plan contract, the down payment was paid in cash when the
contract was executed with the contract price balance due in installments. Under
the deferred payment contract, a portion of the down payment was paid in cash, the
rest in installments, and the balance of the contract price was paid by a negotiable
note signed at the time the contract was executed.
3. 83 S.Ct. 601 (1963).
[Tihe student record cards were analyzed and the total number of taught
hours was multiplied by the designated rate per hour of each contract. The
resulting sum was deducted from the deferred income account and reported as
earned income on the financial statements and the income tax return. In addition,
if there had been no activity in a contract for over a year, or if a course were
reduced in amount, an entry would be made canceling the untaught portion of
the contract, removing that amount from the deferred income account, and
recognizing gain to the extent that the deferred income exceeded the balance due
on the contract.... Id. at 603.
4. Mark E. Schlude, 32 T.C. 1271 (1959).
5. Schlude v. Commissioner, 296 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1961).
6. 83 S.Ct. 601 (1963). "Amounts for which services had not yet been performed
and which were not due and payable during the respective periods," were excluded by
the Court from gross income. Id. at 606.
7. INT. Rtv. CODE or 1954, § 446(b):
If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the
method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable income
shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary or his
delegate, does clearly reflect income.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 41, 53 Stat. 24:
... if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation
shall be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion of the Commis-
sioner does clearly reflect the income.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Although the finding of the Supreme Court in this case is based
primarily on two recent decisions,8 the roots of this holding go back to the
early days of the income tax. The case of United States v. Anderson9 first
interpreted the Revenue Act of 191610 as authorizing the accrual method1
of accounting as a basis for computing income tax. However, the accrual
system has not been completely accepted by the courts, one of the principal
areas of difficulty having been the treatment of prepaid income for tax
purposes.
Some lower courts have supported the annual accounting concept 12
in order to justify the inclusion of prepaid income in current income for
tax purposes. However, such a device has not been followed generally, nor
has it been accepted by the Supreme Court, as it can only be applied con-
sistently with regard to cash basis taxpayers. Other courts have applied
the "claim of right" doctrine,13 which has provided even more extensive
problems for accrual basis taxpayers than did the annual accounting con-
cept. The doctrine was first enunciated in North American Oil Consol. v.
Burnet,14 where income was earned in 1916, but was held by a receiver
pending the outcome of litigation with the United States. The government
sought the benefit of all income derived from the operation; however, the
taxpayer prevailed, received the 1916 income in 1917 and tried to defer
the recognition of the income until a later year. Even though at that time
there was a possibility that the government might succeed on appeal in
recovering the 1916 income, the fact that the taxpayer had full and un-
restricted use of the money made it subject to income inclusion in 1917
under the "claim of right" doctrine. Furthermore, Brown v. Helvering15
extended the doctrine to taxpayers employing an accrual basis for their
accounting. There, an insurance agent received commissions, but had a
contingent liability to return some commissions in later years because of
8. American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 81 S.Ct. 1727(1961) ; Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 77 S.Ct. 707 (1957).
9. 269 U.S. 422, 46 S.Ct. 131 (1926).
10. Ch. 463, § 12(a), 39 Stat. 767; ch. 463, § 13(d), 39 Stat. 771.
11. Under the accrual method income is recognized when earned, and expenses
are deducted when incurred, whether or not collected or paid in the same period.
12. See, e.g., Automobile Club, 32 T.C. 906 (1959).
Moreover, the amounts received do not cease to be "income" under the statute
merely because all the expenses allocable to the earning of such income have
not yet been incurred. Wholly apart from the question whether pertinent ex-
penses generally affect the quality of receipts as income, the point here is that
net income under the statute is cqmputed on an annual basis, and, as pointed
out above, there is no necessary correlation in any given year between receipts
and expenses. Expenses with respect to income not yet earned are deductible
when paid or accrued; and conversely, income is reportable when received or
accrued, notwithstanding that some, or even all expenses allocable thereto have
not yet been incurred. Id. at 914.
13. The "claim of right" doctrine provides for the inclusion in taxable income of
money which the taxpayer has without restriction as to use, although there may be
a claim on the money later or even though the expenses which should be matched
with the money received will not occur until a later tax year. The implementation of
"claim of right" is at odds with financial accounting accrual principles which match
revenue and expense in their respective periods.
14. 286 U.S. 417, 52 S.Ct. 613 (1932).
15. 291 U.S. 193, 54 S.Ct. 356 (1934).
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cancellations and reinsurance, The taxpayer proposed either to accrue the
estimated expense of cancellations or to defer a portion of the commissions
as income in the following years. The Court disallowed the deferral of
income, using the "claim of right" rationale, stating that since there were
no restrictions on the use of the money, it did not matter that a contingent
liability in future years existed as to that income.
The "claim of right" tenet was later applied to situations where the
income was unearned. Thus, in the case of Your Health Club, Inc.,16 both
cash and accounts receivable representing contracts obligating the taxpayer
to perform services beyond the end of the taxable year were disallowed
as deferrals. It is suggested that such an extension is totally unjustified.
Taxation is an assessment against income; under the accrual system, an
accepted'accounting basis under section 446 of the Internal Revenue Code,"
cash, accounts receivable, and notes receivable received for services to be
performed in later periods are not current income. Recognizing such a
defect, several circuit courts' 8 have rejected the doctrine, reversing deci-
sions of the Tax Court. In Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner,19 a
retail television dealer on an accrual basis was allowed to defer prepaid
income on a twelve-month television servicing contract over the period of
twelve months. The court rejected the "claim of right" doctrine for un-
earned income, holding that the accounting method of the taxpayer truly
reflected income. The Supreme Court has also refused to apply the "claim
of right" doctrine to the unearned income of accrual taxpayers. The Court
apparently has used a different rationale for inclusion of unearned income.
Thus, in Automobile Club v. Commissioner,20 the Court, relying on sec-
tion 41,21 held that "The pro rata allocation of the membership dues in
monthly amounts is purely artificial and bears no relation to the services
which petitioner may in fact be called upon to render for the member. 22
However, there may have been some justification for the holding in this
case, as the company recognized /12 of the membership dues per month
over the contract year, when, in reality, the services rendered had not
been evenly distributed over the months. Because the club was located in
a northern climate and the services required were demanded more fre-
quently in the winter months, the Court's decision may not have been
unreasonable considering that the taxpayer's system did not properly
match revenue and expense according to the principles of accrual accounting.
16. 4 T.C. 385 (1944); accord, New Capital Hotel, Inc., 28 T.C. 706 (1957)
Curtis R. Andrews, 23 T.C. 1026 (1955).
17. This section provides that income is to be computed by the taxpayer's regular
method of accounting, and unless the method of accounting does not clearly reflect
income that the accrual method is an acceptable one.
18. See Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Pacific Grape
Products Co. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Beacon Publishing Co.
v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955).
19. 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959).
20. 353 U.S. 180, 77 S.Ct. 707 (1957).
21. If taxpayer's system doesn't "clearly reflect income" then this section provides
that the Commissioner may recompute the income by a method which does "clearly
reflect income."
22. 353 U.S. 180, 189, 77 S.Ct. 707, 712 (1957).
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However, the subsequent Supreme Court decision of American Auto-
mobile Ass'n v. United States"5 is not so easily reconciled. There, member-
ship dues were also accounted for on the accrual basis, being treated as
income received ratably over the twelve month membership period. The
Court, relying on the Automobile Club case, held that under section 41
the taxpayer's system was "purely artificial" and that "substantially all
services are performed only upon a member's demand and the taxpayer's
performance was not related to fixed dates of the tax year. ' 24 The dis-
sent, however, carefully shows that the system used by petitioner did
clearly reflect income, and that since the accrual method is provided for
by statute in section 446, the Commissioner had no discretionary power
under that statute to deny the use of the accrual method as to petitioner's
prepaid income.25 Moreover, the majority suggested that Congress had
repealed sections 45226 and 462,27 as it preferred not to allow deferral of
prepaid income.28 The dissent points out the invalidity of this reasoning.
In reality, Congress repealed those sections to prevent a great loss of
revenue from taxpayers who could claim a double deduction in the transi-
tional year of change from one accounting method to another.2 9 The ac-
crual method of accounting was not meant to be disapproved by the repeal
of the foregoing statutes.80
The Supreme Court applied the rationale of American Automobile
Ass'n in deciding the instant case.31 Even though the Court reversed the
lower courts in part (by not including in income amounts not paid or due
for services yet to be performed) still the case seems to extend the scope
of inclusion of prepaid income in gross income for tax purposes beyond
that of American Automobile. Although there the income included was
23. 367 U.S. 687, 81 S.Ct. 1727 (1961).
24. Id. at 691, 81 S.Ct. at 1729.
25. Ibid.
26. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 452, 68A Stat. 152. This section specifically
provided for the deferral of prepaid income by accrual basis taxpayers.
27. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 462, 68A Stat. 158. This section specifically
provided for reserves for estimated expenses to be taken into account in computing
taxable income by accrual basis taxpayers.
28. Since this decision was rendered a statute has been passed allowing deferral
of prepaid income in a limited number of cases. Organizations without capital stock
of any kind, and in which there is Po distribution of net earnings to any member, may
so defer prepaid income. The instant case deals with a profit making organization,
and so does not fall within the provisions of the statute. INT. RZv. CoDE oP 1954, § 456.
29. 367 U.S. 687, 708-09, 81 S.Ct. 1727, 1738 (1961). Such a change had been
allowed without the Commissioner's consent by sections 452 and 462. 1
30. See, H.R. RFP. No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1955); S. Rtp. No. 372,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1955).
31. In the Tax Court, Mark E. Schlude, 32 T.C. 1271 (1959), the decision went
against petitioner on the "claim of right" basis. The court relied on two Tax Court
cases which are without higher court approval that also dealt with unearned income,(Curtis R. Andrews, 23 T.C. 1026 (1955) and Your Health Club, Inc., 4 T.C. 385(1944)) and on a Supreme Court case (Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 79
S.Ct. 1270 (1959)) which dealt with earned income. In the Court of Appeals(Schlude v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1960)) the judgment was re-
versed in favor of the petitioners. The court rejected "claim of right" with regard
to unearned income and held that the system clearly reflected income. However, the
court later vacated its own judgment in Schlude v. Commissioner, 296 F.2d 721(8th Cir. 1961), after the decision in American Automobile Ass'n, 353 U.S. 180, 77
S.Ct. 707 (1957).
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unearned, the cash had been received from the members of the club. In
Schlude, however, much of the unearned income included had not been
received in cash.8 2 Moreover, in Schlude the accounting system was a
better one than that in American Automobile; revenue and expense were
better matched according to accrual accounting principles. In American
Automobile each member's account was not analyzed with the detail that cus-
tomer accounts in Schlude were. Furthermore, the type of services offered
in Schlude was better suited for accounting control than those in American
Automobile. In Schlude a definite number of lessons was contracted for
at a set rate per lesson.33 In American Automobile the services provided 4
were more on a demand basis, whereby the revenue received from each
member could not be matched with the expense applicable to the services
performed for him, as could be done in Schlude. In addition, the total
amount of service to be performed and the expense thereby incurred in
American Automobile, because service was on a demand basis, could not
be matched as accurately with revenue as could be done in Schlude. Al-
though it is true that in Schlude the accounting system could not perfectly
reflect income, it has been pointed out that the deduction of percentage
royalties and sales commissions without accrual in the year paid is a "minor
'defect' in the system [and] should not be the basis of a complete rejec-
tion."85 The dissent strengthens this point by observing that the Treasury
Regulations3 6 provide: "However, in a going business there are certain
overlapping deductions. If these overlapping items do not materially dis-
tort income, they may be included in the years in which the taxpayer con-
sistently takes them into account."' T The dissent further points out that
if they "do 'materially distort income,' then the case should be remanded
for recomputation as to these items."38 In such a case there would be no
wholesale rejection of taxpayers' system; deferred income could be prop-
erly recognized, and the related expenses matched with them.
The main difficulty with taxpayers' system was its recognition of in-
come from cancellations of lessons. The Court's objection to the non-
recognition of cancellation income is unsound. It would be impossible for
taxpayer to know, as the dissent points out, when "services are not rendered
simultaneously with payment . . .the number and amount of cancellations
which will occur at the time the advances are received."39 And the fact is
"that a contract which specified the times at which lessons were to be given
32. The notes receivable were discounted at 50% and no cash had been received
on the accounts receivable included.
33. Here, there were cancellations from which income was realized, a subject
treated infra.
34. 367 U.S. 687, 689 n.2, 81 S.Ct. 1727, 1728 n.2 (1961).
35. Behren, Schlude Holds Prepaid Income Taxable on "Receipt"; Rationale Is
Uncertain, 18 J. TAXATION 194, 198-99 (1963).
36. § 1.461-1(3) (1957).
37. 83 S.Ct. 601, 608 n.12 (1963).
38. Ibid.
39. 83 S.Ct. 601, 608-09 (1963).
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would [not] make any more certain how many of the remaining lessons
students would in fact demand."40
It seems unfair to replace taxpayers' system which does satisfactorily
reflect income with a hybrid system that puts taxpayers on a cash basis
for prepaid income, and which requires an accrual system for other items
of revenue and expense. It is too burdensome to require the taxpayer to
prepare two sets of financial statements at additional expense--one for
financial purposes and another for tax purposes.
The Court's suggestion that an estimate of cancellation income be used
by taxpayers for tax purposes is refuted by the dissent. The dissent admits
that an estimation procedure might more clearly reflect income but rec-
ognizes that such estimates must be based on the same type of statistical
evaluations that the Court struck down in the American Automobile Ass'n
case.
Whatever other artificialities the exigencies of revenue collection may
require in the field of tax accounting, it has never before today been
suggested that a consistent method of accrual accounting, valid for
purposes of recognizing income, is not equally valid for purposes of
deferring income.41
The Court's final proposal is that "it is the right to receive not the
actual receipt that determines the inclusion of the amount in gross income."'42
This statement totally disregards the fact situation in Schlude. The Court
cited two cases43 for the proposition, but both cases dealt with earned income
rather than unearned income.44
Although the instant decision appears to be legally unsound, the
policy consideration in its favor is the major interest of the Treasury in
providing adequate revenue for an enormously expensive government.
However, it is unfortunate that in order to maintain the supply of revenue
the Supreme Court has approved a practice of income inclusion which
defies a statutory command that accounting systems which clearly reflect
income are to be recognized for tax purposes.
It has been suggested in defense of the Court's position that the pur-
poses of financial accounting and tax accounting are different and that there-
fore the systems need not be identical.45 Although it is true that the purposes
of the two are not the same, Congress under section 446 has made provi-
sion for the identity of the two. It would seem that the Supreme Court is
fearful of tampering with the needs of the Treasury and that there will
40. 83 S.Ct. 601, 609 (1963).
41. Ibid.
42. 83 S.Ct. 601, 606 (1963).
43. Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 79 S.Ct. 1270 (1959); Spring City
Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184-85, 54 S.Ct. 644-45 (1954).
44. For example, in the Hansen case, supra note 43, amounts were withheld by
finance companies to cover possible losses on notes given by purchasers to dealers for
automobiles sold.. Such amounts, although not received by the taxpayer, were earned
income according to accrual principles at the time of income inclusion.
45. 42 MARQ. L. Rlv. 131, 136 (1958).
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